How Long Does the Review Process Take for Naval Intelligence Activity

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            Calendar No. 477 116th Congress      }                                   {       Study                                  SENATE  2d Session         }                                   {      116-233  ======================================================================                        INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION Human activity FOR                              FISCAL Twelvemonth 2021                                  _______                                                    June 17, 2020.--Ordered to be printed                                  _______                                            Mr. Rubio, from the Select Commission on Intelligence,                         submitted the following                                R E P O R T                               together with                               MINORITY VIEWS                           [To back-trail S. 3905]      The Select Committee on Intelligence, having considered an  original bill (S. 3905) to authorize appropriations for fiscal  year 2021 for intelligence and intelligence-related activities  of the U.s. Government, the Intelligence Community  Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Bureau  Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes,  reports favorably thereon and recommends that the bill do pass.                 Classified Annexes to the Committee Report      Pursuant to Section 364 of the Intelligence Authorization  Human action for Fiscal Year 2010 (Public Police 111-259), the Manager of  National Intelligence (DNI) publicly disclosed on February eleven,  2020, that the request for the National Intelligence Program  (NIP) for Fiscal Year 2021 was $61.ix billion. Other than for  limited unclassified appropriations, primarily the Intelligence  Customs Management Account, the classified nature of United  States intelligence activities precludes any further  disclosure, including past the Commission, of the details of its  monetary recommendations. Appropriately, the Committee has  prepared a classified addendum to this written report that contains a  classified Schedule of Authorizations. The classified Schedule  of Authorizations is incorporated by reference in the  Intelligence Authorization Human activity and has the legal condition of  public law. The classified addendum is made available to the  Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and the House of  Representatives and to the President. It is also available for  review by any Fellow member of the Senate subject area to the provisions of  Senate Resolution 400 of the 94th Congress (1976).                Section-by-Department Assay and Explanation      The following is a department-past-department analysis and  explanation of the Intelligence Say-so Act for Fiscal  Year 2021 (the ``Deed'') that was reported past the Committee.                      TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES  Department 101. Authorization of appropriations      Section 101 lists the United States Government departments,  agencies, and other elements for which the Deed authorizes  appropriations for intelligence and intelligence-related  activities for Fiscal Year 2021.  Section 102. Classified schedule of authorizations      Section 102 provides that the details of the amounts  authorized to be appropriated for intelligence and  intelligence-related activities for Fiscal Twelvemonth 2021 are  contained in the classified Schedule of Authorizations and that  the classified Schedule of Authorizations shall be made  bachelor to the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and  House of Representatives and to the President.  Department 103. Intelligence community management account      Department 103 authorizes appropriations for the Intelligence  Community Direction Account (ICMA) of the ODNI for Fiscal Year  2021.   TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND Inability Arrangement  Section 201. Authorization of appropriations      Section 201 authorizes appropriations for the CIA  Retirement and Disability Fund for Financial Year 2021.                 Championship Three--INTELLIGENCE Community MATTERS             SUBTITLE A--GENERAL INTELLIGENCE Community MATTERS  Section 301. Restriction on deport of intelligence activities      Section 301 provides that the say-so of  appropriations past the Human activity shall not be deemed to constitute  potency for the comport of whatsoever intelligence activity that is  not otherwise authorized by the Constitution or laws of the  United States.  Section 302. Increase in employee compensation and benefits authorized          by police      Section 302 provides that funds authorized to exist  appropriated by the Human action for salary, pay, retirement, and other  benefits for federal employees may be increased past such  additional or supplemental amounts as may be necessary for  increases in compensation or benefits authorized by constabulary.  Section 303. Clarification of government and responsibilities of          National Manager for National Security Telecommunications and          Data Systems Security      Section 303 permits the National Manager for National  Security Telecommunications and Information Systems Security,  as designated by National Security Directive 42 (NSD-42), to  delegate NSD-42 authorities to a Deputy National Managing director,  without further delegation. Section 303 further reinforces the  National Security Agency'due south (NSA's) mission regarding  authorities and funding programs by ensuring that the National  Director--when carrying out NSD-42 authorities--may supervise,  oversee, or execute (directly or indirectly) the Data  Systems Security Plan (ISSP), simply shall non supervise,  oversee, or execute any aspect of the National Intelligence  Program (NIP) or Military Intelligence Programme (MIP), except every bit  necessary to supervise, oversee, or execute the ISSP. Section  303 also provides that, upon such delegation of say-so, the  Deputy National Managing director may supervise, oversee, or execute  (directly or indirectly) the ISSP, but shall non supervise,  oversee, or execute any aspect of the NIP or MIP, except equally  necessary to supervise, oversee, or execute the ISSP.  Department 304. Continuity of operations plans for certain elements of the          intelligence community in the case of a national emergency      Section 304 requires the Directors of the Part of the  Manager of National Intelligence (ODNI), Key Intelligence  Agency (CIA), National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), Defence  Intelligence Bureau (DIA), NSA, and National Geospatial- Intelligence Agency (NGA) to found continuity of operations  plans for use in the case of certain national emergencies every bit  defined in statute, and share those with the congressional  intelligence committees within 7 days of a national emergency  being declared. Furthermore, Section 304 requires these  agencies to provide the committees with whatever updates to those  plans equally the conditions of the national emergency require.  Section 305. Application of Executive Schedule level III to positions          of Manager of National Security Agency and Director of          National Reconnaissance Part      Section 305 provides that the Managing director of the NRO and the  Manager of the NSA shall be designated as Level 3 on the  Executive Schedule, the equivalent of an Under Secretary. The  Committee recognizes that this provision does non affect the  electric current Director of the NSA'southward military rank or pay. Section 305  is intended to provide the Commission's view as to the  Managing director'south stature in the interagency; it is not intended to  signal back up for a civilian nominee. The Commission farther  clarifies that this provision shall use to a successor  civilian occupying the position of Director of the NRO.  Department 306. National Intelligence University      Department 306 provides the National Intelligence University  (NIU) with the government that the Section of Defence War  Colleges accept regarding faculty member hiring and compensation,  and the acceptance of faculty research grants. Department 306 as well  sustains an independent, external board of visitors to provide  oversight of the NIU.  Section 307. Requiring facilitation of institution of Social Media          Data and Threat Analysis Center      Department 307 provides a requirement regarding Department 5323  of the National Defense Authority Act for Fiscal Year 2020  by requiring that the Social Media Information and Threat Assay  Center exist established non subsequently than 180 days after enhancement  of this Act.  Section 308. Information collection on attrition in intelligence community      Section 308 requires the DNI to fix standards and effect an  annual report on the reasons why unlike categories of  Intelligence Customs (IC) employees split up from service or  applicants to IC positions withdraw from the hiring procedure  later on they have been issued a provisional offer of employment.  Data on workforce attrition should include demographics,  specialties, and length of service. Such reasons may include an  culling job opportunity, a loss of interest in joining the  IC, or the length of time to consummate the clearance process.  Section 309. Limitation on delegation of responsibility for program          management of information-sharing environment      Section 309 stipulates that the President must delegate  responsibilities under Department 1016(b) of the Intelligence  Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 to an official  other than the ODNI on or after October 1, 2020.  Section 310. Improvements to provisions relating to intelligence          community data technology environment      Section 310 streamlines current reporting requirements by  requiring the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) to  develop and maintain a long-term roadmap for the Intelligence  Customs It Surround (IC ITE). Section  310 farther requires the DNI to develop and maintain a business  plan to implement the long-term IC ITE roadmap.  Section 311. Requirements and authorities for Director of the Central          Intelligence Agency to improve instruction in science,          technology, engineering, arts, and mathematics      Department 311 ensures that the Manager of the CIA has the  legal authorities required to improve the skills in scientific discipline,  technology, engineering science, arts, and mathematics (known as STEAM)  necessary to come across long-term national security needs.        SUBTITLE B--INSPECTOR General OF THE INTELLIGENCE Customs  Department 321. Prohibition against disclosure of whistleblower identity          as reprisal against whistleblower disclosure by employees and          contractors in the intelligence community      Department 321 adds to prohibited personnel practices a  knowing, willful or negligent disclosure that reveals an IC  Whistleblower's identifying information without consent.  Section 321 further provides an IC Whistleblower with a private  correct of activeness if such disclosure is taken as a reprisal  against the IC Whistleblower for bringing a complaint.  Section 322. Description of standards regarding whistleblower          complaints and information of urgent concern received by          Inspector General of the Intelligence Community      Section 322 clarifies the definition of ``urgent concern''  regarding whistleblower complaints and ensures that the  Inspector Full general of the Intelligence Community (IC IG) has  authority over determining whether a matter falls within the  ``urgent business organisation'' definition.  Section 323. Clarification regarding submittal of complaints and          information past whistleblowers in the intelligence community to          Congress      Department 323 clarifies that IC Whistleblowers can give their  complaints to the intelligence committees--as long equally the  complaint is provided to both Chairman and Vice Chairman or  Ranking Member or designated nonpartisan staff--regardless of  whether they are determined to be urgent concerns. Department 323  further provides new security protocols in the instances where  complaints include classified information.  Section 324. Limitation on sharing of intelligence customs          whistleblower complaints with persons named in such complaints      Section 324 prohibits Federal government agents and  employees from sharing an IC Whistleblower complaint that has  been submitted to an IC element's IG with a named subject field of  the complaint, unless the IC Whistleblower provides written  consent or data sharing is required as role of the  investigation. Section 324 further provides that any violation  is subject to criminal fines and/or two-yr imprisonment and  requires notification to the congressional intelligence  committees.    SUBTITLE C--REPORTS AND ASSESSMENTS PERTAINING TO THE INTELLIGENCE                                 COMMUNITY  Section 331. Assessment past the Comptroller General of the United states          on efforts of the Intelligence Community and the Department of          Defense to identify and mitigate risks posed to the          Intelligence Community and the Department of Defence by the use          of direct-to-consumer genetic testing past the Government of the          China      Section 331 directs the Comptroller Full general to assess  efforts in the IC and Department of Defense (DoD) to identify  and mitigate the risks posed to the IC and DoD by direct-to- consumer genetic testing by the Authorities of the People'due south  Republic of Cathay. Section 331 further requires the report to  include cardinal national security risks and vulnerabilities, an  assessment of the IC's and DoD's identification and mitigation  of such risks and vulnerabilities, and recommendations for the  IC and DoD to improve identification and mitigation of such  risks and vulnerabilities.  Department 332. Report on use by intelligence community of hiring          flexibilities and expedited human resources practices to clinch          quality and diversity in the workforce of the intelligence          community      Department 332 requires the DNI to submit a report describing  how IC elements are exercising hiring flexibilities and  expedited human resources practices afforded under v U.S.C.  Sec. 3326 and related regulations, including the identification  of any obstacles encountered by the IC in exercising such  authorities.  Department 333. Written report on signals intelligence priorities and requirements      Section 333 requires the DNI to submit a report detailing  signals intelligence priorities and requirements subject to  Presidential Policy Directive-28 that stipulates ``why,  whether, when, and how the The states conducts signals  intelligence activities.'' This study shall be submitted in  unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.  Section 334. Assessment of demand for student loan repayment program          benefit      Section 334 requires the head of each IC element to  calculate the number of personnel who qualify for a student  loan repayment plan benefit, and compare it to the number of  personnel who use for such a do good. The information  provided will include recommendations for how to optimize  participation and enhance the effectiveness of the do good as a  retention tool, to identify any shortfall in funds or  authorities needed to provide such do good, and to include such  materials with the budget request for Fiscal Yr 2022.  Section 335. Assessment of intelligence community need for kid care      Section 335 requires the DNI in coordination with the heads  of other IC elements to provide a report that includes: a  calculation of the full annual demand for child care past  employees at NSA, NGA, DIA, NRO, CIA, and ODNI; an  identification of whatever shortfalls between demand and the child  intendance support past these IC elements; an assessment of options for  addressing whatever such shortfall; an identification of the  advantages, disadvantages, security requirements, and costs  associated with each option; a plan to come across, within five years  later the date of the report, the demand for childcare, and an  assessment of specific considerations that impact the  alternatives available to these IC elements.  Section 336. Open source intelligence strategies and plans for the          intelligence community      Section 336 requires the DNI in coordination with the heads  of each IC element, to conduct a survey of the open source  intelligence requirements, goals, investments, and capabilities  for each element of the IC and to evaluate the usability of the  Open Source Enterprise (OSE). Based on such findings, it  further mandates the DNI shall develop, in coordination with  the heads of each IC element, a strategy for open up source  intelligence drove, analysis, and production across the  IC; create a program for improving usability of the OSE; and  conduct a run a risk and benefit analysis of creating an independent  open up source center.     Using the findings in a higher place, Section 336 further requires the  DNI to develop a plan for a centralized information repository of open  source intelligence. Finally, it mandates the DNI develop a  cost-sharing model that leverages the open source intelligence  investments of each IC element for the beneficial use of the  unabridged IC. It as well requires the heads of ODNI, CIA, DIA, NGA,  and NSA to jointly brief the congressional intelligence  committees on the progress developing the same plans.  Department 337. Program for establishing an chemical element of the intelligence          customs within the United States Infinite Force      Section 337 requires the DNI and the Nether Secretary of  Defence for Intelligence and Security, in coordination with the  Secretary of the Air Forcefulness and the Chief of Space Operations,  to submit a plan for establishing an element of the IC inside  the United States Space Force.            Championship IV--SECURITY CLEARANCES AND TRUSTED WORKFORCE  Section 401. Exclusivity, consistency, and transparency in security          clearance procedures, and right to appeal      Section 401 requires the Executive Branch to publish  adjudicative guidelines for determining eligibility to admission  classified information and makes these guidelines the exclusive  basis for granting, denying, and revoking clearances in guild  to increase transparency and accountability, and ensure due  process. Department 401 further codifies the right of government  employees to appeal unfavorable eligibility determinations to  an agency-level panel. Section 401 as well creates a college level  review by a regime-broad appeals panel, chaired by the DNI  as the government's Security Executive Agent, to review sure  agency-level panel determinations involving allegations of  constitutional violations or discrimination. This DNI-led console  tin remand decisions to the employing agency for reevaluation  if the panel finds valid cause.  Section 402. Establishing process parity for security clearance          revocations      Section 402 requires an agency, in justifying an adverse  security clearance or access conclusion confronting a  whistleblower, to demonstrate by clear and convincing show  that the agency would have made the same security clearance or  access determination in the absence of the whistleblower'south  disclosure. Department 402 establishes parity in the legal  standards practical to IC Whistleblower matters.  Section 403. Federal policy on sharing of derogatory data          pertaining to contractor employees in the trusted workforce      Section 403 requires the DNI to issue a policy within 180  days of enactment that facilitates sharing of derogatory  information the government obtains on cleared contractors  (forth with any mitigation measures put in place) with Federal  contractor employers' chief security officers, to help  companies maintain robust insider threat programs. The policy  must behave with privacy rights, allow individuals to verify  the information, and stipulate that such sharing is just for  purposes of security risk mitigation.                     Championship 5--REPORTS AND OTHER MATTERS  Department 501. Secure and trusted applied science      Section 501 establishes a Communications Technology  Security and Innovation Fund to back up the development and  deployment of open standards-based compatible, interoperable  equipment for 5th-generation wireless networks to create a  more than secure and diverse telecommunications vendor market. It  also establishes a Multilateral Telecommunications Security  Fund to support the adoption of secure and trusted  communications technologies in key markets globally. Section  501 authorizes up to $750,000,000 for each fund and requires  the administrators of each fund to provide almanac reports to  Congress detailing the employ of gain.     Section 501 further requires the DNI to submit a report on  political influence by adversarial nations within international  forums that fix standards for fifth-generation and future  generations of wireless networks, including International  Telecommunication Wedlock (ITU), International Organization for  Standardization (ISO), Inter-American Telecommunications  Commission (CITEL), and 3rd Generation Partnership Projection  (3GPP). Section 501 also requires the DNI and Secretary of  Defense to jointly submit a written report on developing federal  wireless network testbeds for development of fifth-generation  technologies for U.S. military and dual-employ applications using  open interface standards-based compatible, interoperable  equipment. This report should include an assessment of efforts  past foreign governments to build wireless network testbeds for  virtualized telecommunication technologies. Both reports shall  be in unclassified grade with a classified addendum, if required.  Section 502. Report on attempts by foreign adversaries to build          telecommunications and cybersecurity equipment and services          for, or to provide such equipment and services to, certain          allies of the United States      Department 502 requires the CIA, NSA, and DIA to submit to the  congressional intelligence and armed services committees a  joint study that describes the United States intelligence  sharing and military posture in Five Eyes countries that  currently have or intend to apply antagonist telecommunications or  cybersecurity equipment, especially as provided by Cathay or  Russia, with a description of potential vulnerabilities of that  information and assessment of mitigation options.  Section 503. Report on threats posed past use by foreign governments and          entities of commercially bachelor cyber intrusion and          surveillance technology      Section 503 requires the DNI to submit a report to the  congressional intelligence committees on the threats posed by  foreign governments and strange entities using and  appropriating commercially available cyber intrusion and other  surveillance applied science.  Department 504. Reports on recommendation of the Cyberspace Solarium          Commission      Department 504 requires the ODNI, Department of Homeland  Security (acting through the Under Secretarial assistant of Homeland  Security for Intelligence and Analysis), Section of Energy  (interim through the Director of Intelligence and  Counterintelligence of the Department of Energy), Department of  Commerce, and DoD to report to Congress their assessment of the  recommendations submitted by the Cyberspace Solarium Committee  pursuant to Section 1652(j) of the John S. McCain National  Defense force Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Twelvemonth 2019, and to  draw actions that each agency expects to take to implement  these recommendations.  Section 505. Assessment of critical engineering science trends relating to          artificial intelligence, microchips, and semiconductors and          related supply chains      Department 505 requires the DNI to complete an cess of  export controls related to bogus intelligence (AI),  microchips, advanced manufacturing equipment, and other AI- enabled technologies, including the identification of  opportunities for further cooperation with international  partners.  Section 506. Duty to report counterintelligence threats to campaigns      Section 506 requires that Federal presidential campaigns  must report to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) within  one week any offers to contribute, donate, expend, disburse, or  solicit equally prohibited under 50 U.s.a.C. Sec. 30121 by the  following individuals: a foreign principal as defined in the  Foreign Agent Registration Act; a person acting at the  direction of a foreign principal; or a person included in the  list of specially designated nationals or blocked person past the  Treasury Department'southward Office of Strange Asset Command. Section  506 further requires Federal campaigns to establish a policy to  retain and preserve records related to reportable foreign  contacts for non less than three years, and enacts criminal  penalties for willful violations of this section.  Department 507. Combating Chinese influence operations in the United          States and strengthening civil liberties protections      Department 507 provides additional requirements to annual  reports in 50 UsC. Sec.  3237(B) on Influence Operations and  Campaigns in the United States by the Chinese Communist Party  (CCP) past mandating an identification of influence operations by  the CCP against the science and technology sector in the United  States. Section 507 too requires the FBI to create a programme, in  consultation with stakeholders outside the Intelligence  Customs to increment public sensation and detection of  influence activities by the CCP. Finally, Department 507 requires  the FBI, in consultation with the Banana Attorney General  for the Civil Rights and the Chief Privacy and Civil Liberties  Officer of the Section of Justice, to develop  recommendations to strengthen relationships with communities  targeted by the CCP and to build trust with such communities  through local and regional grassroots outreach.  Department 508. Annual study on decadent activities of senior officials of          the Chinese Communist Political party      Department 508 requires the CIA, in coordination with the  Department of Treasury's Office of Intelligence and Assay  and the FBI, to submit to designated congressional committees  annually through 2025 a report that describes and assesses the  wealth and corruption of senior officials of the Chinese  Communist Party (CCP), as well equally targeted fiscal measures,  including potential targets for sanctions designation. Department  508 further expresses the Sense of Congress that the United  States should undertake every effort and pursue every  opportunity to expose the corruption and illicit practices of  senior officials of the CCP, including President Xi Jinping.  Department 509. Report on corrupt activities of Russian and other Eastern          European oligarchs      Section 509 requires the CIA, in coordination with the  Department of the Treasury's Office of Intelligence and  Analysis and the FBI, to submit to designated congressional  committees and the Nether Secretary of Country for Public  Diplomacy, a report that describes the corruption and corrupt  or illegal activities among Russian and other Eastern European  oligarchs who support the Russian government and Russian  President Vladimir Putin, and the touch on of those activities on  the economy and citizens of Russia. Department 509 farther  requires the CIA, in coordination with the Department of  Treasury's Office of Intelligence and Analysis, to describe  potential sanctions that could be imposed for such activities.  Section 510. Report on biosecurity risk and disinformation by the          Chinese Communist Political party and the Regime of the People'southward          Republic of China      Section 510 requires the DNI to submit to the designated  congressional committees a report identifying whether and how  CCP officials and the Government of the People's Republic of  China may have sought to suppress or exploit for national  advantage information regarding the novel coronavirus pandemic,  including specific related assessments. Department 510 further  provides that the written report shall be submitted in unclassified  class, but may accept a classified addendum.  Section 511. Report on result of lifting of United Nations arms embargo          on Islamic Democracy of Islamic republic of iran      Section 511 requires the DIA to submit to designated  congressional committees a report on the Authorities of the  Islamic Republic of Islamic republic of iran's plans to larn armed forces arms if  the United Nations Security Quango's resolutions' ban on artillery  transfers to or from the Government of the Islamic Democracy of  Iran is lifted, every bit well every bit the effects such arms acquisitions  may accept on regional security and stability.  Section 512. Report on Iranian activities relating to nuclear          nonproliferation      Section 512 directs the DNI to submit a report on any  relevant activities relating to nuclear weapons research and  development by the Islamic Republic of Iran and any relevant  efforts to afford or deny international admission to related  facilities in accordance with international non-proliferation  agreements.  Section 513. Sense of Congress on Third Option Foundation      Section 513 expresses the sense of Congress that the Third  Option Foundation'due south work on behalf of the CIA's special  operations community and their families is invaluable, such  that the Director of the CIA should work with the Foundation to  implement department 6412 of the Damon Paul Nelson and Matthew  Immature Pollard Intelligence Authorization Act for Financial Years  2018, 2019, and 2020, which provided special rules for certain  monthly workers' compensation payments and other payments to  CIA personnel.                             Committee Comments   Equitable Handling of Relocation Costs for Intelligence Community          Civilians      As demonstrated in The Intelligence Community Workforce  Agility Protection Human action of 2020, Due south. 3675, introduced past Senators  Burr and Warner, the Committee strongly supports IC personnel  who must brand a permanent alter of station to accept an IC  position. The Committee recognizes such relocations pose  meaning financial hardships for the IC civilians who move  their families to serve their country. Electric current law provides  armed forces members with exemptions from effective taxation penalties  for such relocations, merely IC civilians have no similar  exemptions, thus undermining the IC's ability to recruit and  maintain a highly qualified and motivated workforce. The  Intelligence Customs Workforce Agility Protection Deed of 2020  would provide equitable revenue enhancement treatment for IC civilians who are  subject to similar permanent change of station orders. The  Commission looks frontward to expeditious congressional activeness on  this matter.  Advanced Aerial Threats      The Committee supports the efforts of the Unidentified  Aerial Phenomenon Task Force at the Office of Naval  Intelligence to standardize drove and reporting on  unidentified aerial miracle, any links they have to  adversarial foreign governments, and the threat they pose to  U.Due south. military assets and installations. However, the Commission  remains concerned that there is no unified, comprehensive  process within the Federal Government for collecting and  analyzing intelligence on unidentified aeriform phenomena,  despite the potential threat. The Committee understands that  the relevant intelligence may exist sensitive; nevertheless, the  Committee finds that the information sharing and coordination  across the Intelligence Customs has been inconsistent, and  this issue has lacked attention from senior leaders.     Therefore, the Committee directs the DNI, in consultation  with the Secretarial assistant of Defense and the heads of such other  agencies as the Director and Secretary jointly consider  relevant, to submit a report within 180 days of the date of  enactment of the Act, to the congressional intelligence and  military machine committees on unidentified aerial phenomena  (as well known as ``dissonant aerial vehicles''), including  observed airborne objects that have not been identified.     The Committee further directs the study to include:           1. A detailed assay of unidentified aerial          phenomena data and intelligence reporting collected or          held by the Office of Naval Intelligence, including          data and intelligence reporting held by the          Unidentified Aerial Phenomena Task Force;           2. A detailed analysis of unidentified phenomena data          collected by:             a. geospatial intelligence;             b. signals intelligence;             c. homo intelligence; and             d. measurement and signals intelligence;           three. A detailed analysis of data of the FBI, which was          derived from investigations of intrusions of          unidentified aeriform phenomena data over restricted          United States airspace;           iv. A detailed description of an interagency procedure          for ensuring timely data collection and centralized          analysis of all unidentified aerial phenomena reporting          for the Federal Regime, regardless of which service          or agency acquired the information;           v. Identification of an official accountable for the          process described in paragraph iv;           6. Identification of potential aerospace or other          threats posed by the unidentified aerial phenomena to          national security, and an assessment of whether this          unidentified aerial phenomena activity may exist          attributed to one or more foreign adversaries;           7. Identification of whatsoever incidents or patterns that          point a potential adversary may have achieved          breakthrough aerospace capabilities that could put          United States strategic or conventional forces at risk;          and           8. Recommendations regarding increased collection of          data, enhanced inquiry and evolution, and boosted          funding and other resources.     The report shall be submitted in unclassified class, but may  include a classified annex.  Coordination of Security for Domestic Military Installations and Other          Facilities      The Commission is concerned that, equally a result of several  recent incidents of attempted unauthorized access to Naval Air  Station Key West and Fort Story, Virginia by Chinese nationals,  several security vulnerabilities accept been discovered. Strange  adversaries may be systematically probing military  installations and facilities, and information technology is important that the  Section of Defence take responsibility for ensuring security  measures are adequate, unauthorized accesses are tracked, and  uniform reporting requirements for attempted unauthorized  accesses are established.     Therefore, the Committee directs the Under Secretary of  Defense force for Intelligence and Security (USD(I&S)), in  coordination with the DNI and the Managing director of the FBI, to  establish within the Role of the USD(I&Due south) a designee  responsible for coordination of security for domestic military  installations and other domestic military facilities.  Specifically, the designee'southward responsibilities shall include  tracking unauthorized incursions into domestic military  installations and facilities and attempts at such incursions.     The Commission farther directs that, within 180 days of  enactment of this Act, such individual shall develop a strategy  for security and counterintelligence collection that defines  the adequacy requirements, responsibilities, and processes  for security and counterintelligence for domestic military  installations and other domestic military facilities. In  addition, not less frequently than one time each yr, the Nether  Secretary shall, in consultation with the heads of other  advisable elements of the DoD and the IC, brief the  intelligence and armed services committees on the:           1. Activities of the designee; and           two. Current and predictable trends and developments in          connection with security for domestic military          installations and other domestic military facilities.  Processing, Exploitation, and Dissemination Modernization and          Integration Efforts of the Algorithmic Warfare Cross-functional          Squad of the Department of Defense      The Committee is concerned with the intelligence silos that  take resulted from isolated procurement programs that store  data in private repositories, each with its ain set of  cataloging procedures and proprietary technologies. This, in  plough, potentially limits advantageous communications among  databases, causes vital intelligence to go undetected, and  causes duplication of separately-located analysts' efforts in  reviewing other, less vital, intelligence information.     Therefore, the Committee directs the caput of the  Algorithmic Warfare Cross-Functional Squad, every bit established in  the Department of Defense by memorandum dated April 26, 2017,  to submit to the congressional intelligence and war machine  committees inside 180 days of enactment of the Act, a report  that includes:           ane. Recommendations for the depiction of efforts          between the Team and the Articulation Artificial Intelligence          Center, especially with respect to information labeling,          testing and evaluation;           2. Recommendations for resource sharing across the          intelligence customs for exam and evaluation every bit          Project Maven transitions its independent lines of          try;           3. The program of the Team to integrate unsupervised          bogus intelligence algorithms (e.g., algorithms          that learn from data without beingness trained, allowing          the artificial intelligence to self-improve) into          Project Maven;           4. The program of the Team to incorporate contained          data repositories located beyond the intelligence          community, irrespective of the element providing the          data or the domain they are resident to, into Project          Maven; and           five. The plan of the Team to ensure that development of          Processing, Exploitation, and Dissemination technology          that will facilitate and enhance the capability of          analysts to rapidly search beyond nigh real-fourth dimension          sensors, leverage historical data, and identify          valuable intelligence is incorporated into the Defense          Intelligence Bureau Machine-assisted Analytic Rapid-         repository Arrangement.  Program for Assessing Government Agency Counterintelligence Programs      Antagonist intelligence and security service efforts to  monitor, access, penetrate, and/or manipulate government  facilities, personnel, networks, and supply chains accept get  increasingly more than sophisticated, equally described in the National  Counterintelligence Strategy of the United States. Many  national security agencies, to include those in the DoD and IC,  take mature and robust counterintelligence programs to preserve  the integrity of their systems. Nonetheless, many agencies'  programs lag behind, either because they do not believe they  are at adventure or because of internal funding challenges.  Therefore, the Committee directs the Director of the National  Counterintelligence and Security Center to develop a plan  within xc days of enactment of this Act for assessing the  effectiveness of all regime agency counterintelligence  programs. This program should address the standards and methods of  cess that may apply for different categories of executive  agencies; phasing of implementation over a five-year timeframe  to comprehend all government counterintelligence; the periodicity  for updated assessments; and almanac costs to conduct these  assessment and whatsoever recommendation for a price recovery  machinery.  Security Clearance Procedures and Rights to Appeal      Section 401 of the Human activity provides appeal rights and  procedures for security clearance eligibility determinations.  This provision is not intended to impede bureau decisions  regarding access to classified information for a limited  purpose or duration (e.g., regarding an ballot or one-time  read-ins for a specific event or threat). The Committee does,  notwithstanding, expect agencies to keep Congress fully and currently  informed of any limited purpose or elapsing grants of access.  Finally, the Committee expects the DNI-level appeals panel to  exercise judgment and review only those appeals that the panel  concludes accept evidentiary and jurisdictional merit.  Supporting Industry during Coronavirus      Congress passed the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic  Security Deed (CARES Human action) in March 2020 to provide necessary  assistance to the American economic system during the coronavirus  pandemic. An important element of that Deed was Section 3610,  which provided agencies authorities to modify contracts for  companies supporting the authorities. This provision was  critical to the defence industrial base. The Committee believes  that consistent estimation of Section 3610, peculiarly as  it relates to piece of work conducted at contractor facilities, price  reimbursement methodology, adjustments in payment plans, and  adjustments in contract periods of operation, is essential to  reducing dubiousness and sustaining a vibrant national security  sector. The Committee looks forward to working with the IC  elements in identifying if any additional government or  resources are necessary and identifying lessons learned for any  future national emergency.  Efficient Use of Sensitive Compartmented Data Facilities      The Committee is concerned that there are unnecessary  challenges to the utilization of Sensitive Compartmented  Information Facility (SCIF) spaces by multiple programs amidst  IC and Department of Defence force components and their accordingly  cleared government contractors. These challenges result in  inefficient employ of SCIFs and classified networks. The Commission  finds that it is important to support collaboration and related  efficiencies past sharing SCIF spaces.     Therefore, the Committee directs the DNI, in consultation  with the Secretary of Defense, to issue, within 180 days afterwards  enactment of this Act, revised guidance authorizing and  directing government agencies and their accordingly cleared  contractors to process, shop, apply, and discuss sensitive  compartmented information (SCI) at facilities previously  approved to handle SCI, without need for further approval by  agency or by site. This guidance shall apply to both IC- controlled access programs and DoD special admission programs.                              Committee Activeness      On June three, 2020, a quorum beingness nowadays, the Commission met  to consider the bill and amendments. The Committee took the  following actions:  Votes on amendments to the committee neb and the classified annex      Past unanimous consent, the Committee made the Acting  Chairman and Vice Chairman'south bill, together with the classified  addendum for Fiscal Year 2021, the base of operations text for purposes of  amendment.     By vox vote, the Commission adopted en bloc three  amendments to the classified addendum, as follows: (one) a 2d- degree amendment by Acting Chairman Rubio; (2) an amendment past  Acting Chairman Rubio; and (3) a second-caste amendment by  Senator Sasse.     Past voice vote, the Committee adopted en bloc five  amendments to the bill, as follows: (1) an amendment by Senator  Burr and cosponsored by Vice Chairman Warner, to better  provisions relating to the IC Information technology  Surroundings; (2) an amendment by Senator Risch and cosponsored  by Senator King, to require reporting on Cyberspace Solarium  Commission recommendations; (3) a 2d-degree amendment by  Interim Chairman Rubio and cosponsored past Senators Risch, Edgeless,  Cotton, Cornyn, and Sasse, to improve Section 322; (4) an  subpoena by Senator Bennet and cosponsored by Vice Chairman  Warner and Senators Cotton and Cornyn, to crave an assessment  of critical technology trends related to artificial  intelligence; and (5) an amendment past Senator Cotton to require  a written report on Iranian activities relating to nuclear  nonproliferation.     By vocalism vote, the Committee adopted an amendment past  Senator Burr and cosponsored by Vice Chairman Warner, which  provides the legal government required for the Director of the  CIA to improve recruitment in the areas of science, applied science,  engineering, arts, and mathematics (known as STEAM) necessary  to meet long-term national security needs.     Past vocalism vote, the Commission adopted a second-caste  amendment by Vice Chairman Warner and cosponsored past Senators  Collins and Bennet, to an amendment past Vice Chairman Warner,  and cosponsored by Senators Collins and Bennet, that requires  Federal presidential campaigns to study to the FBI illegal  offers of assistance past known foreign agents. The second-caste  subpoena exempted unpaid volunteers from such reporting  requirements and reduced the criminal penalties. By a vote of 8  ayes and 7 noes, the Committee adopted the amendment by Vice  Chairman Warner, and cosponsored by Senators Collins and  Bennet, as modified by the 2nd-degree amendment. The votes  in person were equally follows: Interim Chairman Rubio--no; Senator  Burr--no; Senator Risch--no; Senator Collins--aye; Senator  Blunt--no; Senator Cotton wool--no; Senator Cornyn--no; Senator  Sasse--no; Vice Chairman Warner--yes; Senator Feinstein--yep;  Senator Wyden--yeah; Senator Heinrich--aye; Senator King--aye;  Senator Harris--aye; and Senator Bennet--yeah.     Past a vote of 7 ayes and eight noes, the Committee did not adopt  an amendment by Senator Wyden to establish the DNI every bit the  Executive Agent for Federal government-wide declassification  processes and requirements. The votes in person were as  follows: Acting Chairman Rubio--no; Senator Burr--no; Senator  Risch--no; Senator Collins--no; Senator Edgeless--no; Senator  Cotton--no; Senator Cornyn--no; Senator Sasse--no; Vice  Chairman Warner--aye; Senator Feinstein--aye; Senator Wyden-- aye; Senator Heinrich--yes; Senator King--yes; Senator Harris-- aye; and Senator Bennet--yep.  Votes to report the committee pecker      On June 3, 2020, the Committee voted to report the bill, as  amended, by a vote of xiv ayes and one no. The votes in person  or past proxy were equally follows: Acting Chairman Rubio--yes;  Senator Burr--aye; Senator Risch--yep; Senator Collins--aye;  Senator Edgeless--aye; Senator Cotton--aye; Senator Cornyn--aye;  Senator Sasse--yes; Vice Chairman Warner--aye; Senator  Feinstein--aye; Senator Wyden--no; Senator Heinrich--aye;  Senator King--yes; Senator Harris--yep; and Senator Bennet-- aye.     By unanimous consent, the Commission authorized the staff to  make technical and befitting changes to the bill and  classified annex.                         Compliance With Rule XLIV      Rule XLIV of the Continuing Rules of the Senate requires  publication of a list of any ``congressionally directed  spending detail, limited revenue enhancement do good, and express tariff  benefit'' that is included in the bill or the commission written report  accompanying the pecker. Consistent with the determination of the  Commission not to create any congressionally directed spending  items or earmarks, none have been included in the pecker, the  report to accompany it, or the classified schedule of  authorizations. The bill, written report, and classified schedule of  authorizations also contain no limited tax benefits or limited  tariff benefits.                             Gauge of Costs      Pursuant to paragraph 11(a)(3) of rule XXVI of the Standing  Rules of the Senate, the Committee deems information technology impractical to  include an judge of the costs incurred in carrying out the  provisions of this study due to the classified nature of the  operations conducted pursuant to this legislation. On June 8,  2020, the Committee transmitted this bill to the Congressional  Budget Function and requested an estimate of the costs incurred  in carrying out the unclassified provisions.                      Evaluation of Regulatory Bear on      In accordance with paragraph 11(b) of rule XXVI of the  Standing Rules of the Senate, the Committee finds that no  substantial regulatory impact will be incurred by implementing  the provisions of this legislation.                          Changes to Existing Constabulary      In compliance with paragraph 12 of rule XXVI of the  Standing Rules of the Senate, the Committee finds that it is  necessary to dispense with the requirement of paragraph 12 to  expedite the business concern of the Senate.                      MINORITY VIEWS OF SENATOR WYDEN      Despite its strong provisions, I voted confronting the Fiscal  Year 2021 Intelligence Authorization Act because the  legislation failed to reform a broken, costly declassification  system. Years of reports, from the Data Security  Oversight Office (ISOO) and the Public Interest  Declassification Board (PIDB), take documented how a flood of  digital nomenclature has overwhelmed the federal government'southward  obsolete declassification system. There is a consensus, inside  and outside government, that the system is unsustainable.     The ISOO has determined that the cost of classification  continues to increment and now exceeds $18 billion annually. A  dysfunctional system that lets more and more classified records  pile up wastes a significant portion of that amount, while  undermining transparency and doing nothing to protect national  security.     There is no dispute virtually the severity of the trouble, nor  well-nigh the solution--modernization of the declassification  system. Senator Jerry Moran and I accept introduced bipartisan  legislation (Southward. 3733) to charge the Manager of National  Intelligence with modernizing declassification, a  recommendation also made past the PIDB. I am disappointed that  the Committee rejected efforts to adopt this commonsense  bipartisan reform and address this ever-growing crisis.     The beak includes a number of important Intelligence  Customs whistleblower protection provisions, four of which  were included at the bidding of Vice Chairman Warner and myself.  Those provisions protect from outside interference the  Inspector Full general's determinations about what whistleblower  complaints to submit to Congress, prohibit the public  disclosure of whistleblowers' identities, prohibit  whistleblower complaints from being shared with the subjects of  those complaints, and provide a channel for whistleblowers to  come up directly to Congress without interference from the DNI.     Unnecessarily restrictive language was added to the  provision facilitating straight whistleblower communications with  Congress. The Intelligence Customs Whistleblower Protection  Act created a process for whistleblowers to communicate with  the ``intelligence committees,'' whereas the pecker appears to  limit such communication to the Chairman and Vice Chairman, or  certain nonpartisan staff. To the extent the neb creates new  limitations on efforts past whistleblowers to convey concerns to  members of Congress, the language in the nib should be  modified or clarified.     The bill includes a 5th whistleblower provision I  proposed that protects whistleblowers whose security clearances  are revoked or who face an agin access determination past  requiring that the government demonstrate by articulate and  disarming prove that the bureau would have fabricated the aforementioned  security clearance or access determination in the absence of  the whistleblower'south disclosure.     It also includes my provision requiring a written report on the  threat posed by the proliferation of commercial spyware as well  every bit U.S. authorities efforts to counter that threat.     Finally, I am pleased that the Classified Annex requires a  report with data that Senator Heinrich and I have been  seeking related to collection conducted pursuant to Executive  Order 12333.                                                           Ron Wyden.                                    [all]

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Source: https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/publications/intelligence-authorization-act-fiscal-year-2021

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